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ABSTRACT 
 
 Since the 1970s, many labor-sending countries (LSCs) like the Philippines have 
increasingly faced a policy dilemma between protecting their citizens’ labor rights and 
maintaining labor market access in the Arab Gulf region. To address such constraint, many 
LSCs have increasingly developed emigration policies and institutions to protect and promote 
workers’ rights. This paper examines how and why labor-sending countries influence their 
emigration policies, particularly in the case of Qatar. Based on 45 in-depth qualitative 
interviews between 2011 and 2012 with labor diplomats, domestic workers, and labor rights 
leaders in Qatar, I find that despite the absence of legal protection mechanisms, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have influenced Philippine emigration policies and the Kafala 
Sponsorship program. Three informal governance practices have been identified—labor 
mediation program, 48 hour ban policy (“burden-sharing” strategies), and informal 
diplomacy network (“burden-shifting” strategy)—which appeared to have enabled frontline 
welfare bureaucrats to mitigate domestic workers’ cases within the Qatari labor market. 
These informal policymaking practices have not only reinforced frontline welfare 
bureaucrats’ capacity to rule but also their abilities to cultivate relationships, power, and 
conflicts that determine policy outcomes. These empirical findings particularly contribute to 
the larger theoretical debates on the role of state in international migration by shifting the 
discourse to the human agency of the state (mainly of state bureaucrats) to understand how 
labor-sending countries determine policy outcomes in the host countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A low-level employee of the Philippine Office of the Welfare Worker Administration 
(OWWA)1, Jenny explains her dilemma in delivering labor, welfare and protection services 
to Filipina domestic workers in Doha, Qatar: 
If you favor Arab employers, then you’ll look bad to Filipinos in the local community.  They 
accuse you of corruption, sitting in the office and not helping Filipinos.  Yet, if you favor 
Filipinos, it will affect our relationships with employers.  Then, what should we do?  (Jenny, 
interview, 22nd December 2011).2 
Jenny and other low-level state employees (henceforth, “frontline welfare bureaucrats) are 
part of the global debate on the appropriate role of labor-sending states3 like the Philippines 
in protecting citizens’ labor/employment rights while maintaining global labor market access 
in the host country.  Unlike democratic labor-receiving states, authoritarian Gulf States4 like 
Qatar are particularly challenging regions for labor-sending states because they exclude 
domestic workers5 from labor laws, citizenship rights, and reproductive rights6, categorizing 
them as “informal workers” or “partial citizens” within the labor market (Gamburd 2009; 
Shah 2004; Parrenas 2001).  Frontline welfare bureaucrats inevitably confront a “double-edge 
sword” between protecting labor/employment rights and securing foreign remittances and a 
labor market niche for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).  Therefore, I focus on the complex 
roles and impact of highly centralized Philippine administrative institutions (specifically 
OWWA) and how their frontline welfare bureaucrats manage these conflicting policy 
interests in Qatar. 
 As one of the world’s largest labor exporters, the Philippines has exported at least 8 
million out of 80 million Filipinos (or 10% of the total Philippine population) to over 200 
countries and territories (Rodriguez 2010; Solomon 2009; Agunias & Ruiz 2007; Martin et.al 
2004). Supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
1970s, President Ferdinand Marcos adopted a labor export policy when he passed the 
Presidential Decree 442 to resolve “two major problems: unemployment and balance of 
payment position” (Agunias 2007:2).  This state policy both developed into a “stop-gap” 
solution to the Philippine economic recession and became an economic imperative to exploit 
global labor market demands.  It has also expanded Philippine state control and legitimacy by 
regulating the OFW private recruitment and protections and forging 13 bilateral labor 
agreements with labor-receiving states to formalize its diplomatic entry (Blank 2011; 
Solomon 2009; Go 2004). This has directly formed the Philippine foreign policy strategy, 
known as the “country-team approach,” which aims to promote and protect OFW labor rights 
while expanding global labor/employment opportunities.  As a result, the Philippines has 
become a critical state broker supplying the cheapest low-skilled care services for the Gulf 
States within the Middle East and global labor market. 
                                                          
1OWWA is a state agency which legally mandates frontline welfare bureaucrats to “provide overseas Filipino 
workers (OFWs) all the assistance, particularly enforcement of contractual obligations by agencies/or by their 
principals” (POEA 2012). 
2 To maintain confidentiality, I used pseudonyms for all the participants. 
3Labor-sending states refer to countries that adopted labor export as government policy to generate foreign 
remittances needed to finance trade deficits and loans.  
4 The Gulf States is comprised of Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. 
5I used ILO Convention 189’s to define domestic worker  individuals engaged in domestic work within an 
employment relationship. 
6Reproductive rights include the right to pregnancy and family reunification. 
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 As the largest exporter of domestic workers to Qatar, the Philippine state’s country 
team approach strategically markets Filipina domestic workers under the Kafala Sponsorship 
Program, 7  the temporary labor immigration program in Qatar. This particular demand 
intensified in the 1970s when the Qatarization law imposed preferential hiring on Qatari 
citizens (particularly females), who had recruited Muslim domestic workers. The Philippine 
state exploited this requirement by exporting approximately 32,000 out of 189,000 Filipinos 
in 2010 (17% of the total OFW population) to Qatar (Philippine Embassy Report (PER) 
2010).  The existing bilateral labor agreements, combined with employers’ linguistic and 
other requirements “such as beauty, politeness, and cleanliness,” poised Filipina domestic 
workers above other foreign domestic workers yet these prized workers remain legally 
unprotected against labor exploitations within Qatari labor market. If labor contractual 
conflicts arise between Qatari employers/agencies and domestic workers under the Kafala, 
the OWWA is the only institution under the country team approach that directly provides 
labor conflict mediations.  Therefore, it is critical to investigate how frontline welfare 
bureaucrats manage conflicting policy interests in Qatar. 
This paper examines how and why frontline welfare bureaucrats influence Philippine 
emigration policies in Qatar.  While media reports widely publicize domestic worker abuses 
and suicides throughout the Gulf States, little empirical and theoretical studies have 
investigated how and why Filipino frontline welfare bureaucrats fail to address such abuses.  
I argue that, despite the absence of legal protection mechanisms, frontline welfare bureaucrats 
have effectively influenced Philippine emigration policies and the Kafala by employing 
informal governance practices to mitigate domestic worker cases within the Qatari labor 
market. This case study will provide new theoretical perspectives on how and labor-sending 
states like the Philippines manage their conflicting policy interests.  It fills in gaps for 
academic scholars and policymakers about their real impact in the global migration debates.  
I divided this paper into four sections. The first section explains the literature review and 
theoretical building blocks for analyzing the roles of frontline state bureaucrats and of labor-
sending states in international migration.  The second section explains the methodology and 
design. The third section examines the mandates, constraints and informal governance 
mechanisms of frontline welfare bureaucrats within the Qatari domestic work sector.  The 
fourth section analyzes the reciprocal power struggles and interstate dependency between and 
among frontline welfare bureaucrats and key stakeholders, highlighting their “burden-
shifting” and “burden-sharing” approaches within the Kafala bond structures in Qatar. The 
conclusion section reviews the empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions of 
this research while recommending a new research agenda for studying state bureaucrats and 
labor-sending states in global migration debates. 
 
II. THEORIZING LABOR-SENDING STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION 
 Many scholars have understated nation-states’ roles in shaping international 
migration, despite their strong influence on the volume, type, and scale of migrant flows 
(Massey 1999; Zolberg2000; Teitelbaum2002).  As Zolberg (2000:71) acknowledges, “it is 
remarkable that the role of states [….] has been largely ignored by immigration theorists.” 
Yet small-scale studies are even more problematic because they have entirely focused on 
democratic labor-receiving states (Calavita 1992; Fitzgerald 1996; Massey 1999; Meyers 
2000; Cornellius et.al 1994) and some on authoritarian states (Tsai-Chuan 2011).  Limited 
                                                          
7The term Kafala i originated from the Bedouin custom of providing temporary affiliations and protections to 
strangers or tribes for certain purposes (Beaugue 1986). 
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studies have focused on labor-sending states’ bureaucratic institutions and policies, 
specifically in authoritarian Gulf States (particularly Qatar) that have the largest stock of 
international migrants (IOM 2012).  More importantly, existing studies have largely excluded 
the impact of state bureaucrats, who directly negotiate labor market access and rights in the 
host country.  
 Since the 1970s, labor-sending states have articulated, facilitated, and encouraged a 
development policy-based model of temporary labor migration. Two competing views have 
dominated the debates. The first view contends that labor-sending states intensify emigration 
flows to generate remittances necessary to address foreign debts, finance trade deficits and 
balances (Hugo and Stahl 2004).  These strategies have become a “safety valve” that 
significantly mitigates potential economic recession or poverty while externally addressing its 
financial debt obligations to the IMF, the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions (Teitelblaum 1984; Stark 1993).  The intensification of high or low-skilled 
emigration flows further reduces high underemployment and unemployment pressures 
through the absorption of a large labor surplus, particularly within rural informal sectors 
(Hugo and Stahl 2004).  These economic interests do not only further incentivize labor-
sending states to promote “long-term but temporary migration” but also broadly incorporate 
emigration as part of their long-term migration-development strategies (Schmitter 1986). 
Conversely, the second view claims that labor-sending states specifically confront 
emigration policy dilemmas in the host country: (1) brain drain and (2) labor exploitation.  
Labor-sending states, particularly those with small highly-educated populations (i.e. African 
or Caribbean states), critically face brain drain—loss of highly skilled manpower—which 
directly threatens their national economic development. This is problematic because it could 
significantly outweigh the effects of remittances to their national economies (Faini 2006; 
Misrah 2006; Ratha 2005). Second, labor exploitation, exclusion, and deaths of many migrant 
workers (particularly those “partial citizens” like in the Gulf States) in the host country pose 
direct challenges for labor-sending states’ extra-territorial administrative capacity to provide 
adequate labor/employment protections (Cornellius 2004; Arnold & Shah 1986). These 
conflicting interests put labor-sending states in a “trade-off policy dilemma” between 
securing labor market access and protecting the labor/employment rights of their citizens in 
the host countries. 
Despite the growing literature on the state’s role in international migration, few 
scholars have empirically tested how and why labor-sending states weigh this trade-off policy 
dilemma, particularly within authoritarian state contexts.  This empirical and theoretical 
inquiry is critical as it makes us unaware about the policy behavior or preferences of labor-
sending states in determining their emigration policies. In fact, the lack of theoretical and 
empirical studies can be partly due to the difficulty of accessing labor-sending states’ internal 
bureaucratic functions, which directly spurred this empirical research. To reconcile these 
empirical and theoretical gaps, it is critical to look inside the labor-sending states by deeply 
analyzing how frontline welfare bureaucrats directly manage these mandated conflicting state 
policies. An in-depth case study of labor-sending states, specifically the Philippine Office of 
the Welfare Worker Administration (OWWA), highlights important methods to decode how 
labor-sending states, acting through the agency of frontline state bureaucrats, manage this 
trade-off policy dilemma, particularly for labor/employment protection policies. 
 
Migration Research on the Philippine State  
 Many scholars have argued that the Philippine state has actively facilitated a labor-
export policy model to secure significant economic benefits (mainly remittances) while 
extending external political authority by establishing bureaucratic and administrative units in 
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the host country (Rodriguez 2010; McGovern 2006; Parennas 2001; Gonzalez 1998).  This 
creates what Rodriguez (2010) calls a “labor-brokerage” system in which the Philippine state 
strategically “manufactures” OFWs by developing complex intermediary institutions (i.e. 
international recruiters) to train, deploy, and mobilize cheap labor intensifying the inflow of 
remittances. Such extra-territorial institutions have transformed the Philippines into a 
deterritorialized state that seeks power and international legitimacy to strategically achieve 
its functional imperatives (Solomon 2009).  Its state recognitions for migrants as “modern 
day heroes” have directly reinforced the power of the Philippine state over their citizens, 
further legitimizing their obligations to their homeland “imagined communities” (Anderson 
1991). 
 Others have claimed that the Philippine state has strongly emphasized its economic 
interests over labor/employment protection for its citizens (Rodriguez 2010; Parennas 2011; 
Battistella 1999).  In analyzing the role of states in neoliberal economies, Ball and Solomon 
(2008) argue that the Philippine labor-export as government policy has deep seated paradox 
between promoting human rights and access in host countries. They argue that the Philippine 
state’s Republic Act 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 simply 
remains problematic because such policy has done little to fully curb abuses. It was only 
symbolically utilize to reinforce the caring nature of the Philippine state yet has very little  
power to secure labor/employment protections for OFWs globally (Ball and Solomon 2002; 
Battistella 1999).  They further contend that the uneven political power with the labor-
receiving states thus limit Philippine sovereignty and control to protect their citizens in the 
host country (Chi 2008), which shifts the protection “in the hands of the migrants themselves 
and normal diplomatic interactions” (Rodriguez 2010; Parennas 2001; Battistella 1999).  This 
makes OFWs expendable commodities vulnerable to legal exploitations within the global 
economy. 
 Despite their different political, social and economic analyses, many scholars appear 
to have agreed that the Philippine state is purely driven by its economic interests in the host 
country.   Yet their theoretical view of the state is problematic because it ignores “the 
domestic, multi-level struggle sovereignty what those interests are not only in the economic 
sense, but also in the realm of their political and ideological interests” (Keohane and Nye 
1987; Fitzgerald 2006).   They view the Philippine state as a rational, unitary actor pursuing 
its national interests while competing with other nation-states to maximize economic benefits 
for their national economies.  In the Philippine context, little empirical studies have examined 
in-depth how, when, and why the Philippine state acts through the agency of state bureaucrats 
and fails to protect OFWs in the host country.  Calavita (1992:198) reminds us, “structures 
don’t move, people do.”  Therefore, human agency approach is a critical strategy to 
investigating the complex interests of state bureaucrats and of labor-sending states in 
international migration. 
 
Theoretical Building Blocks for Analyzing Frontline Welfare Bureaucrats  
There is no one unified theoretical framework for studying the role of frontline 
welfare state bureaucrats in international migration discourses. Thus, I develop theoretical 
building blocks to explain such a phenomenon in Qatar and the Middle East.  Although I do 
not intend to formulate a unified theory within the limitations of this paper, I wish to 
highlight the under-researched nature of frontline state bureaucrats dealing with trade-off 
policy dilemma in the host country using the most relevant theoretical concepts. I apply the 
following strands of theories (see Table 2)—state autonomy theory (Skocpol 1985), state 
manager and policy framework (Block 1987; Rosenbaum 2006), and street-level bureaucracy 
(Lipsky1980). Instead of integrating such discrete theories, I have outlined a general 
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framework to analyze the complex roles and challenges of frontline welfare bureaucrats in 
international migration in the host country. 
 
Table 2: Theoretical Building Blocks Diagram8 
 
 
 
State autonomy theory 
 Conceptualized by Theda Skocpol (1985: 9), states are “conceived as organizations 
claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not 
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society.”  The state 
autonomy theory, defined as the ability of state actors to pursue their own interests and 
agendas, accentuates the independent power of the state from the rest of society. The state, 
acting through the human agency of state actors, is an autonomous entity that pursues its 
interests and agendas within its capitalistic environment.  It uses two indicators to justify the 
state power: (1) the size of state budget and employee population as sources state agency 
power; and (2) expansion of federal government (growth of state officials’ power).  These 
state powers do not only emphasize the critical importance of state capacity and autonomy 
but also the administrative state control in pursuing its own policy interests or objectives.  As 
Skocpol (1985: 260) highlights: 
The administrative organization of government is crucial […] Governments that have, or can 
quickly assemble, their own knowledgeable administrative organizations are better able to 
carry through than are the governments that must rely on extragovernmental experts and 
organizations.” 
 
                                                          
8This theoretical framework expands Calavita (1992)’s Bracero Program analysis, examining the 
implementation roles of American policymakers in the 1960s. 
State Policy Managers 
[ Block (1987) & 
Rosenbaum (2006)] 
Labor Market  Access 
State 
State - Centered Theorists  
[ Skocpol (1985) & Block  
(1987)] 
Labor/Employment  
R ights 
State Policy  
Implementers 
[ Lipsky (1980)] 
Case Study: 
Philippine State OWWA in Qatar 
PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 8 
 
This particular theory critically situates the autonomy of state actors or administrative units 
that have a significant influence in determining policy outcomes independent from any 
societal influence.  
 
State Manager Framework 
 Fred Block (1987) contends that despite the powerful influence of the corporate or 
elite groups, the state, acting through the agency of state managers, have a strong capacity 
and substantial autonomy to formulate public polices unconstrained from any societal forces. 
Block (1987: 84) acknowledges that “state managers collectively are interested maximizers—
interested in maximizing their power, prestige, and wealth,” enjoy substantial autonomy and 
have the political capacity to restrict power of the dominant classes.  He views the state, 
acting through the agency of state managers pursuing and imposing their interests and 
agendas on civil society, as a non-monolithic.  He further claims that political power and 
legitimacy of state managers is heavily dependent on structural economic growth, as elite and 
other corporate lobbying players often constrain the effectiveness of state policies (Block 
1987; Calavita 1992).   This competitive state system directly produces interdependency and 
conflicts between elite lobbying groups and state managers operating within the broader 
political economic context.  
 
State Policymakers Framework 
 In understanding the broader roles of labor-sending states in the host country, 
Rosenbaum (2006)’s analysis of the emigration policy interests and preferences of Mexican 
and some Central American policymakers  is crucial in understanding how labor-sending 
state bureaucrats behave given the existing labor market competition with other labor-sending 
countries globally.  Drawing from the 88 respondents interviewed, he describes the trade-off 
between the political economic benefits and social costs for these labor-sending states and 
their migrants.  Employment and remittances were identified by state bureaucrat 
policymakers as key benefits, while at the same time raising human and labor rights 
exploitation as key concerns calling emigration as a necessary evil to maximizing short-term 
economic benefits. 
This framework highlights the preferences of key state bureaucrats and policymakers 
in emigration policymaking, while underlining the key trade-off struggle for many labor-
sending states in labor-receiving countries in the West.  This framework demonstrates labor-
sending states emphasis of the human agency, preferences, and agencies of state 
bureaucrats/policymakers in maintaining emigration policy systems.  
 
Street-Level Bureaucracy 
 In situating the role of state policy implementers, Michael Lipsky (1980)’s theory of 
street-level bureaucracy argues that state policy implementers are the most important state 
actors yet excluded in policy making.  He defines street-level bureaucrats as “frontline” 
workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs.  Because of their 
substantial autonomy and discretion, they are a powerful part of the policy implementation 
community, emphasizing that “policy implementation in the end comes down to the people 
who actually implement it” (Lipsky 1980:3).  Unlike state managers, street-level bureaucrats 
are caught in a dilemma between responding to citizens’ demands and ensuring an effective 
policy implementation process. Finally, Lipsky (1980) identified multiple problems with 
street-level bureaucracy like limited resources and interpersonal relations clients,” which 
directly constraining the effectiveness of such a policy.  
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The case study analysis on the role of Philippine frontline labor bureaucrats in 
international migration is grounded in a human-agency-specific model of the state.  Structural 
factors and human agency are linked on both empirical and theoretical grounds.  I borrow 
from state-centered institutional approaches from Skocpol (1985), Block (1987), Rosenbaum 
(2006), and Lipsky (1980) to explain the human agency and informal governance 
mechanisms of frontline welfare bureaucrats in dealing with the trade-off policy dilemma 
within a wider capitalist context of Qatar.  This particular approach does not only enable us to 
examine the interests, constraints, and tensions faced by the Philippine state, but also utilized 
as a critical starting point to analyzing how other labor-sending states function in regards to 
the authoritarian Gulf States contexts 
 
III. METHODOLOGY  
 
Given the under-researched roles and informal governance practices of frontline welfare 
bureaucrats in Qatar, I utilized a qualitative research design to examine complex human 
social interactions and power struggles within the fieldwork environment. I applied an 
ethnographic research design, including in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations, and content analysis to examine 60 in-depth qualitative interviews between 
2011 and 2012 with labor diplomats, domestic workers, and labor rights leaders in Qatar.  
These were documented in the form of field notes and transcripts.  A combination of these 
methods produced a tri-dimensional perspective that enabled me to analyze complex 
assumptions about the policy dilemma of frontline welfare bureaucrats in Qatar.  No 
interviews were recorded due to the research participants’ requests. Research participants 
were all interviewed in English, Tagalog, and Kapampangan (a Philippine dialect), while 
working with a native Qatari-Arabic speaker, Walid to increase the robustness of my 
participants’ responses.  
 
IV. FRONTLINE WELFARE BUREACRATS AND THE KAFALA SYSTEM IN 
QATAR: THE ‘GATEKEEPERS’ O FTHE PHILIPPINES STATE 
 Coined from Lipsky (1980)’s street-level bureaucracy theory, frontline welfare 
bureaucrats are low-level state employees, who directly deliver labor and welfare services to 
citizens.  Because of their substantial authoritative discretion, interpretative capacity, and 
innate public resource knowledge within the workplace, they have the strong capacity to 
influence public policy outcomes (Lipsky 1980; Evan and Harris 1982). More importantly, 
internal bureaucratic constraints like public budget deficits have not only forced frontline 
welfare bureaucrats to adopt context-based administrative strategies (i.e. rationing, screening 
and routinizing techniques) but also developed informal policy practices to effectively 
achieve intended state policy objectives (Lipsky1980). As policy implementers, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have understated power and capacity to influence Philippine emigration 
policies. Applying my ethnographic fieldwork in Qatar, I analyze both empirically and 
theoretically the frontline welfare bureaucrats’ mandates, constraints and informal 
governance mechanisms.  Despite these structural constraints, frontline welfare bureaucrats 
have effectively developed informal governance practices to renegotiate the inherent power 
imbalance under the Kafala, which have been overlooked in the Qatari migration discourse. 
 
State Mandates of Frontline Welfare Bureaucrats  
 To engage with its temporary migrant population abroad, the Philippine state employs 
a country-team approach (see Table 4 below), a state protective mechanism comprised of 
three Philippine emigration institutions: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Philippine 
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Overseas and Employment Agency (POEA), and Department of Labor and Employment 
(DOLE) to broadly promote and protect the rights and welfare of OFWs globally.  Two small 
labor and welfare offices—Assistant to the Vice National Office (AVNO)9 under the DFA 
and Office of the Welfare Worker Administration (OWWA) under DOLE are mandated to 
address domestic workers’ issues (Agunias and Newland 2012). 
Table 4: Philippine Country Team Approach in Qatar 
 
Philippine State 
Embassy
Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA)
Assistant to the Vice National 
Office (AVNO)
Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE)
Philippine Overseas and 
Employment Administration 
(POEA)
Office of the Undersecretary 
of Migrant & Workers 
Affairs (OUMWA)
Office of Welfare Worker 
Administration (OWWA)
 
 
 
Philippine State Institution Type of 
Institution 
Policy Objectives 
Department of Foreign Affairs (1898) 
Assistant to the Vice National Office 
(1995) 
Office of the Undersecretary for 
Migrant and Workers Affairs (1995) 
Sub-ministry 
 
 
Other state 
institution 
Protect and promote the rights of OFW rights and 
welfare 
 
Provide legal services for distressed OFWs 
Provide migrant protection services, including 
legal and judicial support to distressed OFWs 
Philippine Overseas and 
Employment Agency (1982) 
Sub-ministry Regulate overseas employment programs, 
specifically recruitment agency procedures 
Department of Labor and 
Employment  
Office of Welfare Worker 
Administration (1981) 
Sub-ministry 
 
Other state 
institution 
 
 
Provide services like repatriation, business loans 
and labor/employment mediation/protections 
 
These Philippine emigration institutions and their bureaucrats strictly follow a legal principle 
that a “regular, organized and documented migration” is the starting point for worker’s 
protection (Sto.Tomas 2009).   This does not only influence the policy implementation 
behaviors of frontline welfare bureaucrats but also serves as policy criteria to determine 
domestic workers’ access to the existing OWWA and other state services. 
In Qatar, frontline welfare bureaucrats have applied such legal principle within their 
internal mandates (i.e. facilitate labor conflict mediations and monitor domestic workers’ 
cases in local Qatari police and civil courts) and external mandates (i.e. collective 
enforcement of court rules with local security and border immigration authorities).   During 
labor conflict and repatriation negotiations, frontline welfare bureaucrats represent and 
exhibit the absolute authority to determine the type and level of labor/employment protections 
for domestic workers.  For example, documented domestic workers, who legally justified 
their legal employment status and other employment conditions, would receive  more direct 
                                                          
9AVNO focuses on criminal-related cases, including rape. 
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attention than undocumented workers. Immigration status is thus utilized as one of the 
specific criteria that determine domestic workers’ access to OWWA services. Without their 
institutional representation and passport authorization, domestic workers (particularly those 
with illegal/overstayed status) will not be repatriated to the Philippines.  These complex 
mandates do not only emphasize the critical importance of legal documented migration, but 
also signify the devolution of the state power and authority to frontline welfare bureaucrats as 
the Philippine state’s official gatekeeper in Qatar.   
Apart from their OWWA mandates, frontline welfare bureaucrats are also tasked to 
secure domestic workers’ labor/employment rights under the Kafala irrespective of their 
financial and administrative constraints.  The absence of labor law and institutional 
mechanisms for domestic workers signify the Qatari state’s laissez faire approach, directly 
“grant[ing] labor-sending states [like the Philippine state] custodial power over their citizens” 
despite the territorial scope (Rodriguez (2010: xxiv). Frontline welfare bureaucrats therefore 
have a “dual” custodial roles and power from the Philippine and Qatari states to “police” 
emigration and immigration actors. 
Both the OWWA and Kafala mandates do not only expand frontline welfare 
bureaucrats’ discretionary authorities but also challenge the inherent power inequality 
between employers and domestic workers. Two specific Kafala bond rules that provoke 
violent conflicts and tensions between frontline welfare bureaucrats and stakeholders. The 
first rule emphasizes that each domestic worker is tied to a local sponsor under a 2-year 
contract, whereby employer switching is prohibited. This gives employers the custodial 
power to cancel the residency permit and immediately deport the domestic worker, producing 
an “un-free slave bondage” in Qatar (Human Rights Watch 2010 & Varia 2010). The second 
rule, known as the 3-month probationary grace, is a “trial” period where employers/agencies 
evaluate the domestic workers’ skills and personal characters.  Any breach of labor 
provisions (i.e. running away) within the trial period invalidates employment contracts.   
These Kafala rules mandated that domestic workers are not legally required to pay for the 
recruitment related efforts but my findings reveal that they still pay “a placement fee” to 
secure their employment positions. If a domestic worker runaway within this trial period, 
labor recruiters will be legally required to reimburse employers’ initial bond of $2,335 for a 
Muslim or $2,060.44 for a non-Muslim domestic worker. In contrast, if a domestic worker 
runs away after the trial period, labor recruiters will not be obligated to reimburse employers’ 
bond, making employers “losers” in the domestic work market.  These financial loses 
embedded in the zero-sum nature of Kafala bond policies perpetuate and produce a violent 
political space between employers and frontline welfare bureaucrats, creating “fault line” 
conducive to policy failures. 
 
Structural Constraints in Qatar 
Institutional Constraints 
Given their complex dilemma under OWWA and Kafala mandates, frontline welfare 
bureaucrats have thus become structurally constrained in Qatar.  
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Table 5: Frontline Welfare Bureaucrats: 
Mandates, Constrains and Informal Governance 
Practices
OWWA KAFALA
Frontline Welfare 
Bureaucrats 
Legal Constraints:
(1) Exclusion of domestic workers from national 
labor laws & bilateral agreements
(2) Limited/weak role of ILO laws
Political Constraints
(1) Criminalization of public projects/strike
(2) Labor market competitions
Institutional Constraints:
(1) Weal multilateral capacity
(2) Public budget deficit
Structural constraints Informal Governance Mechanisms
Labor Mediation
48 Hour Policy Ban
Informal Diplomacy Network
 
 
Table 5 highlights two institutional constraints—weak multilingual staff capacity and 
public budget deficits—have threatened their internal control to mitigate the constant flow of 
runaway domestic workers.  The staffing ratio in 2011 between frontline welfare bureaucrats 
and the total OFW population was 2:189,000 (excluding labor/administrative bureaucrats), 
which have constrained their labor case monitoring capacities and labor conflict mediations 
(PER 2011). During Ramadan period, for example, frontline welfare bureaucrats have to 
manage at least 150 domestic workers (see photo below) who runaway due to mostly breach 
of labor complaints (i.e. long working hour, no food, non-payment).   These heavy domestic 
worker caseloads have not only directly impacted their internal administrative capacity to 
enforce both OWWA and Kafala policies, but also challenge their public expenditures. 
 Public budget deficits—particularly the limited repatriate funds—have further 
constrained frontline welfare bureaucrats’ capacity to provide immediate repatriation for 
domestic workers to the Philippines.  As a result, they have to host to at least 80 runaway 
domestic workers temporarily living in a two-bedroom OWWA shelter house. My fieldwork 
interviews reveal that the perceived abundance source of OWWA free tickets have 
encouraged domestic workers to runaway to OWWA.  While frontline welfare bureaucrats 
have the authority to request tickets from the OUMWA they selectively employ free tickets 
based on the following criteria: (1) previous employment records and behavior; (2) 
immigration status; and (3) validity claims.  By using these criteria, frontline welfare 
bureaucrats then employ a rationing technique to prioritize service allocation for domestic 
workers. They further conduct secret interviews with other runaway domestics within the 
OWWA temporary shelter house to validate their stories. These unwritten policymaking 
practices illustrate their discretionary control and power to discriminate state services, which 
have often been translated as “unfair” and “unacceptable” by runaway domestic workers.   
Yet despite other Filipina domestic worker immigration status, they have continued to extend 
state services like temporary shelter to undocumented domestic workers. This shows that 
frontline welfare bureaucrats have the agency to protect domestic workers, yet the weak 
institutional capacities and multiple flows of runaway domestics into OWWA, have impacted 
their mobility and protection capacity. 
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Legal Constraints 
Because of the domestic workers’ explicit exclusion from the Qatari Labor Law 
No.14, frontline welfare bureaucrats have struggled to cope with the increasing domestic 
worker cases.  Article 3 of the Qatari Labor Law No.14 states that “the provisions of this law 
shall not apply to … the persons employed in domestic employment such as drivers, nurses, 
cooks, gardeners and similar workers” (Qatar Embassy 2011).A recent bill was further 
reviewed to address employers’ contractual obligations yet it has not been implemented due 
to strong political opposition from employers’ associations (Gulf News 2010). The 
Philippine-Qatar bilateral agreements 1997 and 2008 also exclude domestic workers’ 
protection, as the Qatari state has opposed due to real and perceived fear of more obligations 
from other labor-sending states (Go 1998).  Additionally, the Qatari state has neither ratified 
nor implemented major ILO laws for domestic workers.  Although it favored the recent 
International Labor Convention on Migrant Rights of Domestic Workers (ILO No. 189), the 
Qatari state continues to follow a laissez faire approach, which has sparked criticisms from 
the civil society community.  As the general secretary of the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC)  secretary, Sharan Burrow warns the Gulf states:  The ITUC will 
continue to shed light on the working conditions of migrant domestic workers in the Gulf 
countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain” irrespective of structural 
legal constraints.  A frontline welfare bureaucrat, Chris questions such ILO law: “How can 
you implement another ILO law if Qatar doesn’t even have a domestic law for domestic 
workers? (Chris, personal interview, 12th June 2011).  The non-legal binding status of 
ILO.No189, combined with labor law absence and institutional mechanisms, significantly 
impacted frontline welfare bureaucrats’ operation. These external legal have directly 
constrained labor/employment protection mechanisms and administrative capacity in Qatar.  
 
Political Constraints 
Public protests or strikes are considered criminal offenses under Qatari laws.  As a 
result, frontline welfare bureaucrats lack the political capacity to publicly demand labor rights 
against the Qatari state.  More importantly, the intense labor competitions with other labor-
sending states have indirectly constrained their capacity to push for stronger 
labor/employment rights.  This does not only increase the bargaining power of the Qatari 
MOI over the Philippine state and other labor-sending states, but also directly impede their 
bilateral negotiations, regarding domestic workers’ inclusion (Arnold and Shah 1986; Go 
1994).  Yet such structural constraints do not signify that frontline welfare bureaucrats have 
no agency and options to protect domestic workers in Qatar. Unlike state managers, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have a much more direct agency and authority over domestic worker 
caseloads, directly filing lawsuits against employers and labor recruiters in the Qatari civil 
and police courts. These human agency practices and political constraints reflect their ability 
to challenge dominant status quo and secure administrative legitimacy in Qatar.  
 
Informal Governance Mechanisms: Labor Mediation, 48 Hour Policy Ban, and 
Informal Networks 
 Despite complex macro and micro constraints, frontline welfare bureaucrats have 
developed three informal policymaking practices to cope with the power imbalance in 
Qatar:(1) labor mediation, (2) 48-hour policy ban; and (3) informal diplomatic networks. 
These informal mechanisms have produced what I referred to as the “burden sharing” and 
“burden shifting” approaches in addressing conflicts between frontline welfare bureaucrats 
and stakeholders.  While pervasive media coverage has directly equated domestic workers’ 
abuses and deaths to the Philippine state’s incapacity, the complex ways in which frontline 
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welfare bureaucrats negotiate within these power structures and constraints have been widely 
ignored in the literature. 
Labor Mediation 
Rather than directly confronting employers in the police or Qatari civil courts, 
frontline welfare bureaucrats utilize labor mediation as a non-binding diplomatic tool to 
accommodate within the pre-existing labor/employment conflicts. This mechanism has mixed 
implications on local and expatriate employers in Qatar.  Expatriate employers (i.e. Lebanese, 
Egyptians) have to actively participate in labor mediation due to their similar temporary 
immigration status with domestic workers under the Kafala. Real and perceived fear of 
deportation from the Qatari security/ immigration authorities directly influences expatriate 
employers to comply with frontline welfare bureaucrats’ mandates.  A frontline welfare 
bureaucrat, Cynthia notes: 
If they are found guilty and do not comply with court rules, non-Qatari  employers can be 
deported.  We exert pressures against these expatriates because they employ more domestic 
workers than the local Qatari populations.  We file more cases to the local police stations and 
civil courts to make them accountable for the nonpayment cases. We work with local police 
authorities to go into these employers’ houses or villas and enforce the courts’ order to repay 
the nonpayment wage for domestic workers. We follow them along with the domestic workers 
to obtain those unsettled salaries, benefits and other personal belongings of domestic workers 
(personal interview, 12 June 2011). 
 
Frontline welfare bureaucrats leverage expatriate employers’ immigration status to exert 
administrative control in labor conflict mediations.  Approximately 1, 031 domestic worker 
cases were filed and mediated in 2010, representing 37% of the total OFW complaints against 
employers/companies (PER 2011). While no existing studies have examined the effectiveness 
of labor mediation, my fieldwork findings suggest that labor mediation have effectively made 
employers and labor recruiters accountable during labor conflict negotiations, especially if 
domestic workers have legal employment status.  This burden-sharing strategy has not only 
increased the administrative power of frontline welfare bureaucrats, but also improved its 
relative autonomy to independently enforce Philippine state policies against potential 
violators. 
If Qatari employers refuse to cooperate during labor mediation, frontline welfare 
bureaucrats often file labor complaints (given the domestic workers’ permission) in the police 
courts to exert monetary claims.  The lengthy court procedures taking between 2 to 13 
months have made to a certain extent it impractical for domestic workers to file labor 
complaints.  A runaway domestic worker, Mariela filed a labor complaint at the police 
station, silently expressing words: “I want to go home now. I don’t want to be here and I 
don’t want to waste my time. Nobody is going to take care of my children in the Philippines” 
(Marlen, personal interview, 26th May 2011).  Explaining Marle’s case, a frontline welfare 
bureaucrat, Peter notes that employers “withhold salary distribution as a way to discipline 
domestic workers.  We don’t give up; domestic workers do in the process” (Peter, personal 
interview, 28th December 2011).10This contract violation, combined with the emotional and 
physical distress and isolation from their families, dissuade domestic workers from filing 
labor complaints.  Only few domestic workers have challenged their employers up to the civil 
court level.  In 2011, Marina filed a labor complaint against her Qatari employer, who refused 
to pay her 1 year- salary, “kicked” her in the stomach for improperly cleaning the villa’s 
second floor (Marina, personal interview, 24th May 2011).  He also refused to provide food 
and water, forcing Marina to runaway to OWWA assistance and waited for at least seven 
months her court settlement. The civil court favored her claim yet the employer adamantly 
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refused to pay the settlement. Marina only obtained her unpaid salary of $1200 through 
consistent follow-up pressure by frontline welfare bureaucrats and Qatari security officers 
who directly visited the employers’ villa residence to enforce court rulings. These legal and 
administrative constraints faced by domestic workers clearly illustrate the inherent power 
imbalance embedded in the Kafala system. 
 
48 Hour Policy Ban 
Frontline welfare bureaucrats employ a 48-hour policy ban to jointly ban labor 
agencies both in Qatar and the Philippines for failing to address domestic workers’ issues. 
Due to massive inflows of runaway domestic workers, a 48 hour policy ban enables frontline 
welfare bureaucrats to make labor recruiters responsive, fostering faster labor conflict 
negotiations on domestic worker cases.  This enforcement mechanism “blocks” labor 
agencies’ on-line visa applications and labor contracts in the Philippines, forcing labor 
recruiters to participate in the labor conflict negotiations and pay for the domestic workers’ 
non-payment cases.  This burden-sharing strategy effectively reduces the increasing inflow of 
OWWA domestic worker cases.  When Perla run away from her employer after working for 6 
months due to unpaid salary, frontline welfare bureaucrat, Precy called both labor agency and 
employer together for labor mediation.  Because the employer refused to cooperate, Precy 
automatically used the 48-hour policy ban to shift the pressure to labor agencies in order to 
address the domestic workers’ cases.  Rather than received a policy ban for their visa and 
contract applications, the labor agency was forced to the plane ticket and some funds for 
Perla since it was beyond the 3-month probationary rule.  This burden-sharing strategy has 
enabled frontline welfare officers to make labor recruiters and agencies accountable to 
resolve their domestic work cases. 
If domestic workers fail to justify their labor complaints, frontline welfare bureaucrats 
directly support labor agency recruiters.  When a 23-year old domestic worker, Ella runaway 
after working for two weeks for a Qatari employer, the labor agency recruiter filed an 
OWWA complaint and sought labor mediation: 
  Walid:  Why is Ella like that, madam? She always cries and     
   don’t want to work us anymore.  We paid a lot and this is    
   not good for our business; we are not going to pay for her ticket until she  
   returns to us?” (labor recruiter, Walid, personal observation, 14th June 2011).   
  Ella: I feel homesick. I want to go home now. I can’t work here anymore (domestic  
   worker, Ella, personal observation, 14th June 2011).  
  Precy:  This is not a vacation. You come here to work, Ella. I hope you   
   understand that everybody is taking a risk (frontline welfare bureaucrat, Precy, 14th
   June 2011). 
 
Because Ella privately decided to “go home,” Precy had to make Ella accountable for her 
plane ticket for repatriation.  This informal burden-sharing strategy does not only increase 
labor recruiters’ accountability but also reinforce frontline welfare bureaucrats’ position as a 
“regulator” and “promoter” within the Qatari domestic work sector. 
 
Informal Networks 
Informal networks are diplomatic tools utilized by frontline welfare bureaucrats to 
address the most difficult domestic worker cases. As local “conduits” in Qatar, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats (particularly of Muslim backgrounds) exhibit religious similarities and 
have local knowledge of the influential political Qatari families (Knowles 2008).  These 
Qatari families are dependent on domestic workers’ services, therefore frontline welfare 
bureaucrats utilize these domestic workers as “channels” to fostering informal linkages and 
relationships. In particularly, they focus on local Qatari immigration authorities and Qatari 
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political elites, using diplomatic networks to redress extreme domestic worker cases (i.e. 
pregnant or extra-marital domestic affairs).  A Muslim frontline welfare bureaucrat, Patricia 
acknowledges that she “knows” the most relevant families in Qatar. Whenever Qatari 
employers seek a domestic worker, Patricia treats them differently by privately expediting 
their domestic workers’ requests and ensuring good quality of domestic workers (Patricia, 
personal interview, 15th March 2012).  Their local native knowledge and interpretative 
ability, combined with religious similarities, enable them to informally associate with 
powerful networks crucially necessary to minimize extreme domestic worker cases.  When 
one Filipina domestic worker, Janice had an illicit with another Filipino (which is illegal in 
Qatar), became pregnant and was sentenced for imprisonment (known as a “love case”) 
(personal interview, 5th February 2011) 11  Due to weak multilingual capacity and high 
turnover of frontline welfare bureaucrats, Janice’s case was only resolved when a Muslim 
frontline welfare bureaucrat, Antoniao leveraged her established friendship with a Qatari 
judge, who she privately assisted in finding a domestic worker.   Without such informal 
networks, Janice would have been imprisoned for two years in Doha.  This example 
illustrates the dependency of frontline welfare bureaucrats to local political elites and 
bureaucrats to secure administrative legitimacy.   This ‘trade-off’ relationship has not only 
determined their legitimacy and success, but their abilities to enforce labor/employment 
protection for domestic workers in Qatar.  
 
V. FRONTLINE WELFARE BUREACRATS AND STAKEHOLDERS: 
“BURDEN-SHARING” AND “BURDEN-SHIFTING” APPROACHES 
Given their structural constraints in Qatar, frontline welfare bureaucrats have devised 
context-based informal governance practices—labor mediation, 48 hour policy ban, and 
informal diplomacy networks—to renegotiate the power inequality embedded in the Kafala 
system.  These informal governance practices do not signify the weakening power and 
relative autonomy of frontline welfare bureaucrats, rather strongly demonstrate their 
administrative capacity to rule given the multiple layers of constraints in Qatar. This chapter 
analyzes how frontline welfare bureaucrats apply informal governance practices as “policing 
strategies” to secure domestic workers’ labor/employment rights with key stakeholders. I 
propose the “burden-sharing” and “burden-shifting” framework to investigate how and why 
frontline welfare bureaucrats manage their dual state mandates while maximizing 
labor/employment protections in Qatar. It further decodes the power struggles between 
frontline welfare bureaucrats and internal stakeholders12 (employers, labor recruiters, and 
domestic workers) and external stakeholders (state managers, security/immigration 
authorities, and civil society), highlighting their interests, constraints, and coping mechanisms  
More importantly,  it analyzes the interagent dependency and reciprocal power struggles 
between frontline welfare bureaucrats and the Qatari security/immigration authorities and 
Philippine state managers.   
 
Internal Stakeholder Analysis: Migration as a Shared Responsibility 
 Because of the domestic workers’ exclusion from the Qatari labor law, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have become dually mandated to secure labor/employment protections 
for domestic workers under both OWWA and the Kafala.  The burden-sharing framework 
                                                          
11 Qatar uses a Sharia law where extra-marital affairs are legally prohibited. 
12 I classified the key stakeholders into internal and external stakeholders.  Internal stakeholders refer to those 
who interact and negotiate daily on domestic worker issues with frontline welfare bureaucrats. External 
stakeholders refer to those who broadly address domestic worker issues at large. 
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would be applied for internal stakeholders, while the burden-shifting framework for the 
external stakeholders. 
 
Table 6: Internal Stakeholders Analysis 
Frontline Welfare 
Bureaucrats
Domestic Workers
Employers
Labor Agency
 
 
Actor Interests Constraints Coping Mechanisms Costs13 
Employers Domestic Workers Ban on hiring domestic 
workers; deportation; “3-month 
probationary period” 
Lock out domestic 
workers within the villa 
territory 
$2,335.16 (Muslim domestic 
worker); $2,060.44 (non-
Muslim domestic worker) 
Labor 
Recruiters 
Revenue; labor 
Demand for domestic 
workers 
48-hour policy ban; “3-month 
probationary period” 
Lock out domestic 
workers within labor 
agency office  
$2,335.16 (Muslim domestic 
worker); $2,060.44 (non-
Muslim domestic worker) 
Domestic 
Workers 
Remittances No change of employer (2-year 
Kafala rule) 
Escape from employer $1000 (for a return ticket); ban 
on working in Qatar for 2 years 
 
Employers 
 Under the Kafala, employers have stronger bargaining power because they could 
privately regulate the labor contract terms and conditions within private homes.  My 
fieldwork findings reveal that 95% of employers have failed to comply with the Philippine 
state mandate of $400 wage requirements for Filipina domestic workers.  Both local Qatari 
and expatriate employers pay $200 monthly wages, a “common norm” which validates the 
existing policy reports (Human Rights Watch 2010 & 2011). Because of their limited 
interference within these villa residences, frontline welfare bureaucrats have applied labor 
conflict mediations to curb the power imbalance and increase employers’ participation and 
accountability.  These labor conflict mediations have not only fostered diplomatic and 
forceful dialogues with employers, but also became critical steps to secure domestic workers’ 
labor/employment rights.   Without genuine dialogues, frontline welfare bureaucrats would 
inevitably fail to execute their dual state mandates.  As a result, two specific strategies have 
been employed to engage employers in labor conflict negotiations.  First, frontline welfare 
bureaucrats exert administrative pressure against expatriate employers by utilizing their 
temporary immigration status with domestic workers. A Lebanese expatriate employer, 
Ismaeel explains: “I have to handle quickly these cases because if these runaway domestic 
                                                          
13 The cost information was provided by Qatari labor recruitment agencies. 
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workers die or something bad happened, I will be liable. Local police/immigration officers 
would come after me and it’s not good. It’s a headache!” (Ismaeel, personal interview, 14th 
June 2011). This strategy has forced expatriate employers to engage with frontline welfare 
bureaucrats irrespective of their complaints.  Second, if both local Qatari and expatriate 
employers refuse to cooperate, frontline welfare bureaucrats consistently call and visit the 
employers’ villa residences to make employers accountable.   They often collaborate with 
local Qatari security authorities to bring employers into “public shame” for failing to pay the 
domestic workers’ unpaid wage.   These policy strategies have not only forced employers to 
participate in labor conflict mediations, but also reinforced the administrative power and 
legitimacy of frontline welfare bureaucrats to rule despite the power inequality in the Kafala 
system.  
 Although labor mediation has improved accountability and dialogues, it has also 
failed to protect those domestic workers who have been “locked” by employers inside their 
villa residences.  As a coping mechanism, they explicitly encourage domestic workers to 
runaway to OWWA, a solution which often provokes violent tensions.  An Indian expatriate 
employer, Vijay complained about his runaway domestic worker to OWWA, shouting these 
words: “Katrina, tell them what kind of lifestyle you have in our house. Tell them! I work for 
Qatar Petroleum Is this policy of your country to encourage domestic workers to run away? 
This is crazy! (personal observation during labor mediation, 12th December 2011).  Because 
of the absence of a counterpart monitoring mechanisms, frontline welfare bureaucrats have to 
inevitably confront violent dialogues with employers within OWWA.  My fieldwork findings 
reveal that employers who have had runaway domestic workers within the trial period often 
exert tighter pressures to prospective domestic workers by prohibiting any form of  social 
interactions (via cell phones and computers) with other male migrants outside.  They often 
construct oversexualized stereotypical narratives among Asian and African domestic workers 
to justify their internal disciplinary mechanisms over them.  Despite its non-binding burden-
sharing nature, frontline welfare bureaucrats have continued to leverage basic administrative 
rules to increase employers’ accountability and participation. As a frontline welfare 
bureaucrat, Jaime notes: “We need more practical solutions like this. It’s difficult to make 
these employers participate, but to protect workers you need to make them participated and 
emphasize it’s a shared responsibility” (James, personal interview, 18th June 2011).   
Therefore, labor mediation did not only serve as a critical mechanism to promote 
accountability but also rebalanced the power inequality embedded in the Kafala system. 
 
Labor Recruiters 
 Critical tension arises between frontline welfare bureaucrats and labor recruiters when 
frontline welfare bureaucrats directly impose a 48 hour policy jointly blocking labor 
recruiting agencies in the Philippines and Qatar14 that fail to resolve domestic worker cases 
within 48 hours.   The 48-hour policy ban has been an effective strategy because it has not 
only increased labor recruiters’ participation, but also improved accountability and pressure 
towards mostly Qatari-owned recruiting agencies. A Filipina labor recruiter, Kelly notes:  
“they just don’t get it.  Our job is hard too, they only give us 48 hours to resolve cases and 
they want us to pay for the plane ticket.  This is crazy because my moodir (employer) will get 
mad at me.  I might also lose my job if I pay for too many tickets for theses domestic 
workers” (Kelly, personal interview, 12th June 2011).  This burden-sharing strategy has not 
only directly reduced domestic worker caseloads within OWWA, but also forced employers 
                                                          
14 These recruiters are female Filipinas, hired by Qatari nationals, who speak Tagalog, English, and Arabic.   
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and labor recruiters to quickly redress domestic worker cases, reinforcing the administrative 
legitimacy of frontline welfare bureaucrats as state gatekeepers. 
 While a 48 hour policy ban creates accountability, frontline welfare bureaucrats often 
use their discretionary control to selectively issue 48 hour policy against labor recruiters, 
depending on their accountability performance. Yet they also exert their interests by 
informally negotiating enforce such policy using past accountability records of labor 
recruiters.  Labor recruiters who have been more responsive will more likely to get further 
policy ban extension.  At the same time, frontline welfare bureaucrats negotiate with labor 
recruiters if certain maltreated domestic workers, particularly those who fall outside the grace 
period, do not have the capacity to pay for an expedited repatriation ticket and unpaid salaries 
on.  In return, labor recruiters will receive expedited services on their visa and contract 
applications for prospective domestic workers. This burden-sharing approach through 
pakiusap (Tagalog word for “favor”) creates a “barter relationship” where they build mutual 
understanding and incentive mechanisms to informally amend administrative rules to mitigate 
domestic worker caseloads.  This has also been sustained by the ongoing exchange of gifts 
(mainly food) by labor recruiters to OWWA staff members, while using their similar 
kababayan attitude (fellowman support) for distressed domestic workers in OWWA.  
Yet like employers, many labor recruiters have to prevent labor and administrative 
bond costs since they are also directly monitored and constrained by their local Qatari agency 
employers.  As a coping mechanism, they lock their domestic workers and withhold their 
passports to control their mobility, forcing them to work for another employer to recoup their 
financial loss. One runaway domestic worker, Karen notes: 
  We cannot runaway because we are locked up and everyday they bring us to the office  
  agency as if they are making sure that we cannot runaway and at night they are locking us up 
  in one room with other Filipinas who also want to go home. They are scaring us and telling us 
  that cannot go back to the Philippines and that we must pay thousands of riyals just to be able 
  to go home and worst is the secretary who is a Filipina is not our side. Our sponsor released us 
  a couple of days ago but they still want us to work (Karen, personal interview, 14th December 
  2011). 
By locking domestic workers within their office agencies, labor recruiters prevent potential 
loss of bond and avoid a 48 hour policy ban from frontline welfare bureaucrats.  This is an 
important limitation of the 48 hour policy as it fails to cover those hidden domestic workers 
within villa residences or agency offices in Qatar.   A frontline welfare bureaucrat notes, 
“these are type of runaway cases that the media likes to expose.  They can easily sell these 
stories in public and people buy these stories, which make us look bad and irresponsible.”  
These “locked” runaway domestic worker cases often provoke conflicts and tensions between 
frontline welfare bureaucrats and OFWs community and NGO groups.   Despite such 
limitations, a 48 hour policy has been an effective tool to increase accountability and 
participation, reflecting the reciprocal power struggles between domestic workers and 
employers/labor recruiters within the Kafala.  
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External Stakeholder Analysis: Interdependency and Reciprocal Power Struggles 
Table 7: External Stakeholder Analysis 
Frontline Welfare 
Bureaucrats
Civil Society Groups
Filipino State 
Managers
Qatari 
Security/Immigration 
Officers
 
Actor Interests Constraints Coping Mechanisms Costs 
State Managers Labor market access; 
stronger labor protection 
for domestic workers 
Labor market 
competition with other 
labor-sending states 
Shift pressure to 
administrative/welfare 
staff members 
Labor export policy ban 
Security/Immigration 
Authorities 
Security; less domestic 
worker cases/pressures; 
illegal domestic workers 
Limited staff capacity; 
pressure from frontline 
welfare bureaucrats and 
Qatari owned labor 
recruiting agencies 
Informal diplomacy 
“burden sharing 
approaches” with 
frontline welfare 
bureaucrats 
Pressure from the 
national Qatari state 
Civil Society Groups More protection and 
legal coverage for 
domestic workers 
Political/Authoritarian 
state structure 
Transnational labor 
organizing/claims 
making/pressure in the 
host country (i.e. online 
transnational rights 
claiming) 
Deportation 
 
Frontline Welfare Bureaucrats and State Manager Tensions  
 
Qatari Security and Immigration Authorities 
As street-level bureaucrats of the Qatari state, frontline security/immigration 
authorities’ primary interests are to regulate illegal immigration flows and promote internal 
security within Qatar.  Without their final approval for immigration (i.e. deportation, 
repatriation), frontline welfare bureaucrats will not be able to endorse and reduce domestic 
workers living in the OWWA shelter house.  Yet despite their state authority, they are also 
dependent on frontline welfare bureaucrats’ administrative control and power.  They are 
monitored and evaluated by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) regarding runaway domestic 
workers’ complaints.  Interstate collaboration is critical to mutually achieve such policy 
interests and objectives. By partnering with security/immigration authorities, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats were able to collectively minimize domestic worker caseloads both 
within the Philippine migration bureaucracy and Qatari detention centers.  
Given their critical state importance, frontline welfare bureaucrats have therefore need 
to maintain strong informal diplomatic networks to improve their administrative capacity and 
limitations.  When a domestic worker, Paola became pregnant with her Filipino boyfriend in 
Qatar, her employer directly reported the “love case” to the police station (personal interview, 
27th June 2011).  Security and immigration authorities sentenced Paola for four months, 
where she gave birth to her child in Hamad Hospital.  Because of her extra-marital case, she 
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was not immediately released from the detention center.  Paola’s extreme case only changed 
when a Muslim frontline welfare bureaucrat, Warda privately negotiated with a Qatari 
security/immigration authorities to reduce her sentence.  On that same day, Paola’s case was 
resolved and directly repatriated after a week of her release.  This “give and take” negotiation 
between frontline welfare bureaucrats and security/immigration officers have not only 
strengthened their administrative relationships, but also formed interstate dependencies 
deeply embedded within the Kafala system. 
Interstate dependency also creates political conflicts between frontline welfare 
bureaucrats and Qatari security and immigration authorities, regarding the domestic workers’ 
repatriation procedures.  When the stock of runaway domestic worker in OWWA increases 
(particularly during Ramadan), security/immigration authorities are pressured from the MOI 
to reduce runaway domestic worker cases.  As a result, they exert pressure to frontline 
welfare bureaucrats by blocking their repatriation and deportation endorsements for domestic 
workers.  To avoid political confrontation, frontline welfare bureaucrats strategically locate 
the pressure by targeting mostly Qatari owned agencies and employing a 48 hour policy ban, 
forcing them to immediately runaway domestic worker cases.  Given these Qatari owned 
labor agencies’ direct political linkages with Qatari royal family and politicians, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats were able to indirectly halt Qatari security/immigration authorities’ 
policy order.   A frontline welfare bureaucrat, Warda notes: “We don’t want to challenge the 
security and immigration authorities so we have to force these Qataris, since they have more 
power to directly complain with the Ministry of Interior” (Warda, personal interview, 11th 
December 2011).  As a result, Qatari MOI directly sent a letter to the security and 
immigration authorities, mandating them to be “slow down” with frontline welfare 
bureaucrats. These interstate dependencies, combine with the cyclical flow of policy 
pressures, directly reflect the power struggles between the Philippine and Qatari state 
bureaucrats.    Frontline welfare bureaucrats’ usage of informal diplomacy networks have not 
only enabled to accommodate with local security/immigration authorities policy mandates, 
but indirectly pressured them using their informal governance practices (i.e. 48 hour policy 
ban) to exert their administrative control.  In other words, the cyclical power struggles clearly 
prove that the Qatari state, acting through local security/immigration officers, have neither 
“the driving seat” nor have the full autonomy to unilaterally impose regulations on frontline 
welfare bureaucrats. 
 
Filipino State Managers  
Filipino state managers15 serve as the “eyes and ears in foreign labor markets” in 
which new policies that may affect foreign labor are studied” (Rodriguez 2010: 24).  My 
fieldwork findings reveal that Filipino state managers are rather “silent” about pushing for 
stronger labor protections for domestic workers in Qatar (but not with employers).  A 
chairman bureaucrat of the Philippine senate explains: the Philippine state is “caught” 
between bargaining for higher wages, benefits and rights for workers and maintaining a 
strong labor market “niche” in the local labor market (Senate of the Philippines 2011).    
Because of this policy dilemma, Filipino state managers neither aggressively push for 
stronger labor/employment protections nor challenge the Qatari state for the absence of labor 
law protection for domestic workers in Qatar.   While recognizing the importance of labor 
law or bilateral agreement for domestic workers, Filipino state managers’ dilemma was 
captured from my interview with a Filipino state manager, Marcos: “If I were to be followed, 
I would not deploy domestic workers to Qatar.  But if I do that, what type of jobs can I 
                                                          
15 Filipino state managers, include labor attaches and other top-ranking labor administrators. 
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provide them back home?” (Marcos, personal interview, 26th May 2011).  These political and 
economic tensions faced by state managers comes mainly from the fear of labor policy ban 
both from the Qatari and other Gulf States on domestic worker recruitment.  This suggests 
that seeking stronger demands in terms of wages or labor rights could only potentially result 
in “hiring freeze” but also jeopardize other labor market opportunities for OFWs (i.e. 
engineering market) in the Gulf.   
Because of the structural constraints in Qatar, Filipino state managers have not only 
shifted a “top-down pressure” but also reinforced higher policy expectations on frontline 
welfare bureaucrats irrespective of their institutional constraints.   As a result, hidden tensions 
have grown between Filipino state managers and frontline welfare bureaucrats, regarding 
their failures to incorporate domestic workers into the existing bilateral agreements.   As one 
frontline welfare bureaucrat, Precy acknowledges:  
 Some of these high-ranking administrators and diplomats do not really    
  actively negotiate for stronger labor protections.  We address most of the   
  domestic worker cases.  They are weak negotiators and maybe are afraid to lose their careers 
  if they push for stronger rights (personal interview, June 12, 2011). 
These hidden conflicts and competing perceptions on the Philippine state’s policy priorities 
between Filipino state managers and frontline welfare bureaucrats clearly reflect the 
disaggregated views and tensions inside the Philippine migration bureaucracy.   Like Block 
(1989)’s analysis of state managers, Filipino state managers are conceived by frontline 
welfare bureaucrats as “self-interested maximizers,” particularly on their wealth, prestige and 
power, on their “institutional careers” while enjoying substantial autonomy within the 
Philippine bureaucracy hierarchy.   This tension between Filipino state managers and 
frontline welfare bureaucrats clearly reflect the conflicting intra-agency priorities and 
constraints, highlighting the disaggregated natures and interests of the Philippine state in 
Qatar.   Despite their internal bureaucratic conflicts, both Filipino state managers and 
frontline welfare bureaucrats have maintained internal administrative consistent in addressing 
domestic worker cases.  Instead of publicly challenging the Qatari state, both Filipino state 
managers, along with frontline welfare bureaucrats, have learned to politically accommodate 
rather than challenge them at the state-level.  Their structural economic growth dependencies 
as well as some diplomatic and political reliance from local Qatari elites and authorities have 
both administratively and symbolically influenced their ongoing policymaking 
implementation within the Qatari domestic work sector. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper has investigated how and why frontline welfare bureaucrats influence 
Philippine emigration policies in Qatar.   Drawing from state-centered theoretical framework 
like Skocpol (1985), Block (1987), Lipsky (1980), and Rosenbaum (2006), my empirical 
findings reveal four key conclusions.  First, despite structural constrains in Qatar, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have developed strong relative autonomy by effectively employing 
informal governance practices to renegotiate the power inequality with key stakeholders and 
secure administrative power and legitimacy.   This is emblematic given their capacity to 
accommodate rather than confront the Qatari state by filing labor complaints against 
employers within local police and Qatari civil courts. Their informal relationships with 
employers and labor recruiters have improved higher mediation participation and 
accountability key steps to securing negotiation and labor/employment rights for domestic 
workers. Third, frontline welfare bureaucrats have exerted their autonomy and agency by 
directly negotiating and pressuring Qatari immigration authorities (i.e. 48 hour policy ban 
against mostly Qatari agencies).   These have incited politically violent spaces and 
negotiations yet signify the reciprocal power struggles between frontline welfare bureaucrats 
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and stakeholders in Qatar.  They are neither powerless actors nor full autonomous promoters 
and regulators under OWWA and Kafala policies in Qatar.  Finally, they depend on local 
political and Qatari elites and bureaucrats demanding informal “favors” to resolve extreme 
domestic worker cases.  These informal favors and administrative governance practices do 
not reflect their weaknesses but rather demonstrate their diplomatic and administrative 
capacity to extend labor/employment protections for domestic workers irrespective of their 
structural constraints in the host country. Despite their struggling internal capacity, frontline 
welfare bureaucrats have remained internally consistent. 
Without future structural and legal reforms in Qatar, frontline welfare bureaucrats’ 
informal governance practices would be significantly weakened.  The embedded autonomy of 
the Qatari state, combined with its laissez faire approach to domestic workers, would 
significantly pose administrative challenges both to frontline welfare bureaucrats and Qatari 
security and immigration authorities (Evans 1995).  The increasing flexibility of Qatari visa 
regulations, along with the increasing infrastructure and investment-related projects and the 
upcoming FIFA World Cup 2012 would not only intensify the demand for Filipina and other 
foreign domestic workers, but also threaten their political and administrative capacity to 
bargain with the Qatari state.  This could generate more labor exploitations within the Qatari 
labor market.  
 This paper contributes to the larger theoretical debates on the role of nation-states in 
international migration. Following Schmittters (1986) and Rosenbaum’s (2006) analysis, 
labor-sending states, acting through the human agency of frontline welfare bureaucrats, have 
significant relative autonomy and option in challenging the trade-off policy dilemma, 
particularly securing the labor/employment rights of domestic workers in Qatar.  Specifically, 
low-level state bureaucrats have much more aggressive autonomy and power in securing 
labor/employment protections for domestic workers than state managers who have remained 
silent and focused on their institutional career and interests.  By employing burden-shifting 
and burden-sharing approaches through informal governance practices, the Philippines 
frontline welfare bureaucrats have not only maximized labor protections for domestic 
workers, but also maintained market relationships and competitiveness with other labor-
sending states in Qatar.   
 This paper, on a broader scale, methodologically advances the importance of 
disaggregating the role of the state in international migration by focusing on the human 
agency and relative autonomy of state bureaucrats that manage the states’ policy interests, 
objectives and visions in the host country.  It further supports the work of Rosenbaum (2009) 
and Calavita (2010) on the methodologically disaggregated state-centered approaches in 
which the state, acting through the agency of state managers and the component institutions, 
pursues its interests within the market.  In particular, a longer participant observation 
advances street-level bureaucracy theory because it does not only uncover the micro-
constraints that could explain the behavioral techniques of street-level bureaucrats, but also 
the macro-constraints (legal and political constraints) within the authoritarian contexts.  This 
particularly advances Lipsky (1980)’s street-level bureaucracy because it exposes not only 
the micro institutional constraints and policy behaviors of street-level bureaucrats, but also 
the macro legal and political factors that often limit their administrative and political capacity 
to deliver state services to citizens, particularly within the authoritarian Gulf States context.   
Therefore, a participatory approach is crucial in understanding how frontline welfare 
bureaucrats in international migration interpret these conflicting state policy interests and 
visions,  a perspective which most international policy report analyses have largely failed to 
capture.  As such, a closer look inside the state, particularly analyzing low-level 
administrative state bureaucrats’ implementation processes, is pivotal in delineating state 
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interests, constraints, coping mechanisms and diversities, rather than treating the state 
managers as a homogeneous group. 
 
Agenda for New Research 
 The existing literature gap on the role of labor-sending states to non-democratic labor-
receiving states like Qatar, and particularly on their labor/employment policy implications on 
their citizens in the host country, precipitated the need for this empirical research.  While 
previous studies have largely perceived labor-sending states as powerless players in the 
global labor market, labor-sending states now have the option that must be further decoded.  
There is a critical need to shift the discourse to the human agency of the state (mainly of state 
bureaucrats) to understand how labor-sending states determine policy outcomes in the host 
countries rather than treating it as a unitary actor pursuing its own national interests. 
 While this study has analyzed a labor/welfare subunit of an entire Philippine agency, a 
comparative analysis of other labor/welfare subunits that focus criminal/related cases (i.e. 
ATVNO) is critical. This will further highlight the intra-agency interests, conflicts, and 
constraints within the state, but also provide a deeper understanding of whether how and 
when states, despite their disaggregated functions and operations, maintain internal 
consistency in executing state policy interests irrespective of structural constraints.   A 
comparative assessment of another Philippine welfare agency with another labor-sending 
state like Indonesia in the Gulf States would illuminate how the intensity of labor-market 
competition between nation-states impacts the behavior of state bureaucrats, the Qatari state 
or other labor-receiving states. Such comparative qualitative studies with high theoretical 
underpinnings will both improve the general understanding about the ongoing political, 
economic, and social policy dilemma of labor-sending state bureaucrats and rigorously 
develop a theoretical framework on the role of nation-states in global migration. 
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